Limitations in the Use of Achievement Tests as Measures of Educators’ Productivity

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ABSTRACT

Test-based accountability rests on the assumption that accountability for scores on tests will provide needed incentives for teachers to improve student performance. Evidence shows, however, that simple test-based accountability can generate perverse incentives and seriously inflated scores. This paper discusses the logic of achievement tests, issues that arise in using them as proxy indicators of educational quality, and the mechanism underlying the inflation of scores. It ends with suggestions, some speculative, for improving the incentives faced by teachers by modifying systems of student assessment and combining them with numerous other measures, many of which are more subjective than are test scores.

I. Introduction

Test-based accountability is a linchpin of current education reform initiatives at the federal and state levels. Currently, 20 states have implemented or plan to implement systems in which schools or educators receive rewards, sanctions, or both on the basis of students’ test scores. About half have implemented exit examinations—tests that students must pass, regardless of other aspects of their performance, to receive a high-school diploma. A number of large districts, such as Chicago and New York, have implemented “promotional gates” testing; they have imposed a requirement that students receive a minimum score on a specified test in order to be promoted from grade to grade. The reauthorization of Title I pending in Congress as this is written would further strengthen test-based accountability.

This use of tests typically rests on two assumptions: that students’ scores are a reasonable measure of educational output, and therefore that holding teachers accountable for them will provide appropriate incentives to improve the performance
of teachers and the functioning of schools. This paper explains why neither of these commonsensical assumptions is warranted and argues that overly simplistic reliance on achievement tests in accountability systems can produce perverse incentives and seriously inflated estimates of gains in student performance. I do not argue that all high-stakes testing (that is, testing with substantial consequences for educators or students) should be avoided; on the contrary, I conclude with suggestions of possible improvements to the use of tests in educational accountability systems. However, both measurement theory and empirical evidence indicate that model undergirding most current test-based accountability systems is naïve, that the effects of these systems are unlikely to be as positive as proponents assume, and that the apparent gains in performance may be partially—in some cases, entirely—illusory.

After brief comments on the history of testing in the United States, the paper describes the logic and construction of educational tests. It discusses three issues that arise in trying to infer the performance of educators from the performance of their students: limitations of the measures employed; difficulties inherent in drawing inferences about the causes of gains in student performance; and perverse incentives created by test-based accountability systems. It describes studies that illustrate both the mechanisms and the severity of the problems that have arisen in some test-based accountability systems, but it does not provide a comprehensive review of the research on high-stakes testing. The paper ends with suggestions, some speculative, about possible directions for improving the incentives faced by teachers. It argues that creating the desired mix of incentives for teachers may require not only improvements to assessment systems, but also combining test scores with numerous other measures, many of which are more subjective than are test scores.

II. Historical Context

Standardized testing—that is, testing with uniform questions, administration, and scoring—has a long history in the United States. Such tests date back at least to 1840, and their use in schools burgeoned in the 1930s and after (Haney 1981; Koretz 1992; Resnick 1982). Monitoring the performance of educational systems and holding educators accountable were among the motivations for the early use of standardized tests. Nonetheless, for the first several decades after World War II, tests were used primarily to assess individual students and, to a lesser degree, to evaluate curricula, and their use for monitoring and accountability was limited (Goslin 1963; Goslin, Epstein, and Hallock 1965). The consequences of test scores were minor for most teachers and students, except in the case of college-admissions tests and tests used to determine placement in special education.

The uses of achievement tests have changed dramatically over the past three decades, however. Tests have become increasingly important as a tool—arguably, now the central tool—for holding educators and systems accountable. Some observers trace this evolution to the establishment in 1965 of the federal Title I compensatory education program (for example, Airasian 1987; Roeber 1988). The law required that Title I be monitored; standardized achievement tests became a primary means of doing so. A further, large step in the evolution of accountability-oriented testing was the rapid spread of state-mandated minimum-competency testing during the
1970s (Jaeger 1982). Minimum competency tests were most often relatively easy
multiple-choice tests used as a requirement for high school graduation.

A wave of concern about the nation’s educational system in the 1980s, exemplified
by *A Nation at Risk* (National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983), gave
another boost to the use of tests as an accountability tool in the 1980s. The growing
use of standardized tests for accountability was arguably the core component of the
“educational reform movement” of that decade. As one observer noted at the time,
“Nearly every large education reform effort of the past few years has either man-
dated a new form of testing or expanded uses of existing testing” (Pipho 1985).
New state-mandated tests were implemented, some tests were made more difficult,
and the consequences of scores for students, educators, and administrators were often
increased.

Support for the testing of the 1980s waned at the end of the decade because of
a growing awareness that coaching for these tests inflated scores and degraded in-
Linn, Graue, and Sanders 1990; Shepard 1988a, 1988b; Shepard and Dougherty
Many states turned to new forms of testing, convinced that these assessments would
be less susceptible to inflated scores and would improve instruction. These new forms
of assessment are often lumped together under the rubric “performance assessment”
but are actually diverse. They include on-demand open-response tasks (such as solv-
ing a mathematics problem and explaining the solution), portfolios, hands-on perfor-
mance tasks (such as conducting an experiment with scientific apparatus), and hybrid
tasks that involve both group and individual activities.

In several respects, then, the current wave of high-stakes testing represents a con-
tinuation of trends in policy that extend back several decades. What the past decade
has witnessed has been a rapid escalation in the application of high stakes, a greater
emphasis on including nearly all students in large-scale assessments, and in many
instances an increase in the difficult of tests that students are required to pass.

Several consistent themes characterize these diverse testing policies of the past
thirty years. To the extent that they are used to measure or reward the performance
of educators or schools, they all rely on indirect measurement; that is, the quality
of teachers’ performance is inferred from students’ scores. They rely on high stakes
as an incentive for positive changes in practice. They rest on the assumption that
the measures employed are sufficient and that estimates of improvement are mean-
ingful. All of these notions are problematic.

III. Tests As Samples Of Achievement Domains

Users of test scores often assume that scores are direct and unambigu-
ous measures of student achievement, much as the price of a commodity is unambig-
uous. An increase in test scores, for example, is typically taken as clear evidence
that students are learning more.

Scores on most achievement tests, however, are only limited measures of the latent
construct of interest, which is some aspect of student proficiency. As measures of
these constructs, test scores are generally incomplete, and they are fallible in two senses: in the traditional statistical sense that they include measurement error, and in the sense that they are vulnerable to corruption or inflation.

Therefore, scores on most achievement tests are not inherently meaningful or useful. They become meaningful only to the extent that one is justified in generalizing from the score to the latent construct of interest. Many of the difficulties inherent in using student achievement as a measure of the performance of educational systems stem from this principle of measurement.

The incomplete measurement of achievement is manifested in the process of sampling used to construct an achievement test. This process is often conceptualized as having four stages, each of which entails a narrowing of the focus of the test (see, for example, Koretz, Bertental, and Green 1999). First, one must define the “domain” about which one wishes to draw inferences. For example, should “eighth-grade mathematics” include only material currently taught in many schools, or should it also include material that people think should be taught by the eighth grade? Should it include rudimentary statistics? The defined domain will generally be narrower than the range of possible domains. The second stage of sampling, which entails a further narrowing of the domain, is the definition of a framework that delineates the specific content and skills to be measured. The National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) framework, for example, specifies that conceptual understanding, procedural knowledge, and problem solving should all be tested. The framework is then further narrowed in developing test specifications, which detail, for example, the mix of item types (such as multiple-choice and short open-ended), the mix of content areas (for example, what percentage of the score should reflect simple arithmetic operations), whether calculators are allowable for parts of the assessment, and so on. The final stage of sampling entails selecting specific items to match the test specifications. These are all decisions about which reasonable people can and often do disagree.

The severity of sampling required to construct a test depends on the breadth or complexity of the domain it is intended to represent. A test of the mechanics of punctuation can represent the domain quite well, whereas a test of the cumulative learning of mathematics by Grade 11 must sample severely. Current debate about education tends to focus on simple but very broad inferences (for example, Koretz and Deibert 1996), and the most large-scale assessments are designed to support them. For present purposes, then, we can assume substantial sampling.

Thus, the adequacy of a test—specifically, the adequacy with which it supports intended inferences about mastery of a given domain—depends in part on the adequacy of the sample comprising the test. The sample must be representative of the domain, and it must be large enough to provide reliable estimates. Although there are many other factors that influence the quality of a test, such as appropriate difficulty and lack of bias, the representativeness of the sample is particularly relevant here because it can be undermined when tests are used for accountability.

The sampling required to build a test is influenced by practical constraints as well as decisions about the most important components of the domain. Some aspects of a domain are more difficult to assess than others or may require prohibitive amounts of resources (such as student testing time or development costs). Factual information,
for example, and knowledge of simple mathematical procedures are easier to test than problem-solving ability, creativity in approaching problems, or deep understanding. These constraints lessen the quality of a test’s representation of its domain.

Not only are tests samples of their domains; the domains selected for testing taken together leave many important goals of education unmeasured. State and district testing programs often exclude entire subject areas, and the content of specific courses within subject areas (for example, higher-level courses taken by college-bound students) are often given little if any coverage. Achievement tests also do not measure some of the other attributes that many of us want schools to foster, such as an interest in and respect for learning, motivation to tackle cognitively difficult tasks, and intellectual curiosity.

IV. Limitations Of Test Data

One consequence of these considerations is that results can differ markedly across tests that purport to measure the same domains. For example, in the 1980s, simply changing the relative weight of algebra and geometry in NAEP altered the gap between black and white students. Although some of the differences in sampling may seem minor, current tests differ enough that even statistical linkage is often insufficient to justify using scores on one test to predict performance on another, particularly when scores are needed for individual students (Feuer et al. 1999).

Commonly reported error statistics—the standard error of measurement of an individual score and the standard errors of aggregate scores—do not take into account variations among alternative tests. The former represents the precision of a single test estimated in various ways, such as the internal consistency of the instrument or the correlation across alternative forms of the same instrument. Modern measurement theory has a framework, generalizability theory, for considering many threats to robustness at the same time (Cronbach et al. 1972; Shavelson and Webb 1991). This could be but is generally not used to analyze the robustness of inferences across tests. Variations among tests can have important implications for test-based accountability when the classification of students is important. For example, suppose that two tests, $X$ and $Y$, correlate 0.8 and that a cut-score is set at the mean on both tests. This correlation is within the range one would expect for correlations between uncorrupted, similar tests of the same domain, and lower correlations are not uncommon. Under these conditions, more than 40 percent of examinees would have scores on test $Y$ that differ by half a standard deviation or more from their scores on test $X$, and more than 20 percent of those who would pass on test $X$ would fail on test $Y$.

Differences in results among tests can stem from a variety of factors in addition to the sampling required to construct them. Even jurisdictions using the same test may obtain noncomparable scores because of differences in test administration, date of administration, or other factors (for example, Koretz, Bertental, and Green 1999).

Aggregation (say, to the level of school or district means) does not necessarily make scores from different tests—or even different administrations of the same test—comparable. Aggregation helps when the sources of error are factors that vary at the level of individuals, but not when they are factors that vary systematically
among aggregate units. Choice of tests, timing, rates of exclusion of students with special needs, rules for testing out-of-grade or transient students, and rules for the use of accommodations for students with disabilities or limited proficiency in English all vary systematically among aggregates and therefore can produce serious noncomparability in the results of testing programs.

The sampling required to construct tests leads to an additional limitation that is particularly acute when tests are used for accountability: the susceptibility of scores to inflation or corruption. If instruction focuses on the specific sample comprising the test rather than the domain from which it samples and that it is intended to represent, then performance on the sample will no longer be a good indicator of performance on the latent construct. This is discussed in detail below.

V. Problems Of Inference About Gains

Inferences about the performance of teachers in test-based accountability systems raise two basic questions:

- Are gains meaningful; and
- If so, are they attributable to the behavior of teachers?

A. Are Gains Meaningful?

In lay parlance, people often speak of a test as "valid" or "invalid." Tests, however, are not inherently valid. A score on a given test may justify one desired inference but not another. Validity is therefore a characteristic of an inference—that is, the degree to which evidence from a test justifies the inference. In the case of current accountability systems, two inferences are most important: the conclusion that a given student has sufficiently mastered a domain of interest, and the inference that mastery of a domain has improved. Because inferences about gains are central to current efforts to judge teachers, I will focus on the latter inference in discussing validity. Similar reasoning could be applied to cross-sectional score data, but gains can be misleading even when cross-sectional inferences are reasonable.

The key to validating scores as an indicator of improvement is the notion that tests are small samples of domains. When scores increase, students clearly have improved their mastery of the sample included in the test. This is of no interest, however, unless that improvement justifies the inference that students have attained greater mastery of the domain the test is intended to represent.

Thus, if gains are meaningful, they should generalize from the specific test to other indicators of mastery of the domain in question. Because an exhaustive measure of most domains is impractical, one cannot test the degree of generalization from operational tests to the ideal, complete test. One can, however, examine the degree to which gains on a specific test generalize to other tests and to nontest measures of performance in the domain in question.

To interpret the generalizability of gains in scores, it is helpful to break scores into several components, illustrated here by a hypothetical high-stakes state test and NAEP. Total gains for this hypothetical state on a NAEP assessment are represented
by the ellipse in Figure 1, while total gains on the state’s own test are represented by the overlapping rectangle. The relative sizes of all of the areas in Figure 1 are arbitrary.

The area of overlap represents gains that are both meaningful and generalizable, in the sense that gains on one of the tests will appear on the other as well. The second area in the rectangle represents gains that are meaningful—that is, they represent actual gains in mastery of the intended domain—but do not generalize to NAEP. This could arise if the state’s assessment entails a somewhat different delineation of the domain than does NAEP or if its design samples from the domain differently.

The third area within the rectangle, labeled “state test gains from inflation,” represents increases in scores on the state test that neither generalize to a second test nor represent meaningful increases in mastery of the domain. These gains can stem from cheating, but more importantly, they can arise from a variety of types of test preparation that focus too closely on the content or format of the test and thereby make the sample included in the test—and the scores based on it—unrepresentative of the domain they are intended to measure. Some forms of test preparation that can inflate scores are noted below, under the heading of “perverse incentives.”

The ellipse representing gains on NAEP is divided into two areas rather than three. It includes both generalizable gains and real gains that are not generalizable to the state test. The ellipse does not include a region representing score inflation on the assumption that teachers do not—yet—engage in inappropriate coaching for NAEP.

The distinction between generalizable and nongeneralizable real gains implies that even if test-based accountability works well, gains on a test used for accountability are not likely to be fully reflected in data from other tests. Because of differences in domain specification and sampling, it is reasonable to expect modest discrepancies
in the trends shown by tests used for accountability and other tests. Large discrepancies, however, are reason to suspect inflation of scores.

B. How Severe a Problem Is Score Inflation?

Relatively few studies provide strong empirical evidence pertaining to inflation of entire scores on tests used for accountability. Policymakers have little incentive to facilitate such studies, and they can be difficult to carry out.

However, the studies that have explored the generalizability of scores or gains show that if instruction is sufficiently narrow, apparent mastery will often fail to transfer to different types of problems or even different formats of test items. The extent of this failure of generalization is sometimes startling. Shepard provided a particularly striking example, drawn from a New Jersey state assessment in the 1970s:

When students were asked to add decimals in vertical format, the state percent passing was 86 percent. In horizontal format for identically difficult decimals, the percent passing was 46 percent. For subtraction of decimals in the two formats the passing rates were 78 percent and 30 percent, respectively (Shepard 1988a; drawing on data from New Jersey Department of Education 1976).

One indication of possible score inflation was the well-publicized “Lake Wobegon” study of the late 1980s. A physician, John Jacob Cannell, published a report asserting that most states and an implausibly large number of large local districts reported “above average” scores (Cannell 1987). Although Cannell’s study was incorrect in some details, his basic conclusion that an implausible percentage of jurisdictions were “above average” was confirmed (Linn et al. 1990). While Linn et al. (1990) concluded that technical problems (out-of-date norms that did not reflect recent increases in achievement) contributed to this problem, there was also evidence of inappropriate teaching of the test (Shepard 1990).

At about the same time, another study showed that trends on NAEP were less positive than were changes in scores on many state and local assessments (Linn and Dunbar 1990). A possible explanation is coaching that would inflate scores on the state and local assessments.

Only a few studies have directly tested the generalizability of gains in scores on accountability-oriented tests. The first examined two testing programs in the 1980s that used commercially published multiple-choice tests (Koretz, Linn, Dunbar, and Shepard 1991). These testing programs would be considered "moderate stakes" by today’s standards: they used publicity and other forms of pressure but did not apply concrete rewards or sanctions to either students or teachers.

The study entailed administering several different tests in mathematics, reading, and vocabulary to randomly selected classrooms in two elementary grades. Among those administered were a competing commercial multiple-choice test and a parallel form of the high-stakes test—that is, a form built by the publisher to be as comparable as possible.1 The parallel form was administered to test for motivational differ-

1. Parallel forms are constructed to the same specifications and are designed to have the same means and variances. In classical test theory, parallel forms have identical true scores and differ only in terms of the measurement error in each form.
ences that might bias comparisons between the districts’ tests and the investigators’, while the competing multiple-choice tests were administered to test the generalizability of gains.

The study revealed sizable inflation of test scores in most, but not all, instances. A particularly clear instance (although not the most severe) was found in third-grade mathematics in one of the districts. For a period ending four years before the study, the district administered one test, called Test C in the study. For the next four years, the district administered a competing test, Test B, which to the untrained eye would look quite similar.

In the fourth year in which the district administered Test B, Koretz et al. administered Test C, the identical test that the district had last used four years earlier. Third-grade scores on the parallel form of Test B were very similar to published Test B results, indicating that scores on the tests administered for the study were unlikely to have been depressed by motivational or other artifacts.

This design provides two tests of generalizability: the comparison between Test C in 1986 and Test B the year after; and the comparison between scores on Test C in 1986 (the last year it was administered by the district) and in 1990 (when administered by Koretz et al.). The first of these contrasts could be confounded by a number of extraneous factors, including more recent and harder norms for the newer test, differences in scaling, and differences in the quality of national samples used to obtain norms. The second contrast is free of these potential confounds but could be distorted by changes in the cohorts tested.

Both of these comparisons showed that scores on the test with high stakes were roughly half a year higher than those on a test that was unfamiliar to students. When the district first switched from Test C to Test B, the median score in the district (the median of school medians) fell from a grade-equivalent (GE) of 4.3 to 3.7 (Figure 2). The grade equivalent is the median score obtained nationwide for students in a given month of a given grade. Thus, a GE of 3.7 is the median score nationwide for students in the seventh month (out of 10 academic months) in third grade, or about average for the spring date on which this district administered its tests. Scores then rose on the new test (Test B). After four years it reached about the same level (a GE of roughly 4.3) that had been attained on Test C the last year it was used. The median score on Test C administered by Koretz et al. in the same year was a GE of about 3.7—the score obtained on Test B the first year it was administered, before anyone had a chance to coach students for it.

By the beginning of the 1990s, many policymakers and reformers conceded that accountability could inflate scores on multiple-choice tests but argued that these problems would not arise if states used new tests that are “worth teaching to.” For this reason, Koretz and Barron (1998) investigated the generalizability of gains on the Kentucky Instructional Results Information System (KIRIS) testing program. KIRIS was arguably the most prominent effort nationally during the first half of the 1990s to use performance on one of these new assessments as a basis for holding educators accountable.

In the KIRIS system, schools were evaluated in terms of an accountability index consisting of both test scores and other data (such as dropout rates), but test scores were given far more weight than other data. The KIRIS assessment was complex and changed often, but it included at various times open-response on-demand tasks,
multiple choice items, portfolios, and complex "performance events." As is now common, students’ scores were reduced to a four-point ordinal scale representing the state’s three performance standards. The four ranges created in this fashion were labeled Novice (representing failure to reach the lowest standard), Apprentice, Proficient, and Distinguished. These ranges were assigned arbitrary numerical values (0, 40, 100, and 140). All schools, regardless of their starting points, were expected to reach an index of 100, corresponding to having all students at the Proficient level, within 20 years. The performance target assigned to each school for each two-year accountability cycle was one-tenth of the distance between its starting point and an index of 100.

Schools that exceeded their biennial targets by a sufficient amount received financial rewards that they could use as the staff chose. These rewards were sizable, amounting to tens of millions of dollars over the first two accountability cycles. Schools that fell sufficiently far below their improvement goals could be sanctioned. These performance targets required enormous improvement. The typical school needed to raise scores by roughly two standard deviations over the 20 years merely to meet its target. Obtaining rewards required gains roughly 10 to 20 percent larger. Schools with initially low performance would need to make substantially greater improvements. To put the magnitude of these expected gains in perspective, the mean difference in eighth grade mathematics performance between the United States and Japan in the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) was about 1.1 standard deviations, and the gap between blacks and nonHispanic whites on achievement tests is often around 0.8 to 1.0 standard deviation (for example, Hedges and Nowell 1998). The size of these expectations for improvement may have increased the inflation of scores Koretz and Barron (1998) observed.

Koretz and Barron (1998) used both generalizability of performance gains to other
assessments and patterns internal to the KIRIS data in an effort to evaluate gains, but only the former are discussed here. One comparison was between gains on KIRIS and gains on NAEP. This comparison was particularly important because KIRIS was designed to reflect substantially NAEP’s framework in mathematics and reading and because the state’s NAEP data reflect a representative sample of students. It was limited, however, to the few grades and subjects tested by NAEP in state-representative samples: fourth grade reading for the first and third years of the KIRIS assessment, and fourth and eighth grade mathematics for the first and fifth years. The second comparison contrasted KIRIS trends in mathematics, reading, and science to those on the ACT (the dominant college-admissions test in Kentucky). To address the self-selection of the students who took the ACT, this latter comparison was limited to students who took both assessments and who attended schools in which at least 10 students did so.2

Gains on KIRIS were large—sometimes extremely large—during the initial years of the program but showed only limited generalization to NAEP. Between 1992 (the first year in which KIRIS was administered) and 1994, fourth grade reading scores on KIRIS increased by about three-fourths of a standard deviation—a gain large enough to be suspect without any further evidence. Scores on the NAEP reading assessment, by contrast, remained essentially unchanged (Hambleton et al. 1995). Between 1992 and 1996, KIRIS scores in fourth-grade mathematics increased by about 0.6 standard deviation (Table 1). NAEP scores in the state increased as well, by 0.17 standard deviation. The increase in NAEP scores was not much more than one-fourth as large as the gains on KIRIS. Much the same pattern appeared in eighth grade mathematics, but the contrast was slightly starker: KIRIS scores increased 4.1 times as much as NAEP scores (Table 2). A recent study found similar patterns in Texas—much larger gains on the state’s high-takes test than on NAEP (Klein et al. 2000).

A 0.13 to 0.17 standard deviation gain is appreciable for a period of four years, and some might argue that the apparently sizable inflation of scores on KIRIS is a reasonable price to pay for a real improvement of this magnitude. A comparison of Kentucky to other states that participated in NAEP, however, casts doubt on the notion that Kentucky’s gains on NAEP were an effect of KIRIS. Kentucky’s gain

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### Table 1

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIRIS</th>
<th>NAEP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raw gain</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardized gain</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio, KIRIS to NAEP</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Koretz and Barron (1998)
Table 2
Kentucky’s Gains in Eighth-Grade Mathematics, KIRIS and NAEP, 1992–6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIRIS</th>
<th>NAEP</th>
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<td>Raw gain</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardized gain</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio, KIRIS to NAEP</td>
<td>4.1</td>
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</table>

Source: Koretz and Barron (1998)

on NAEP was roughly the same as the national increase and was statistically indistinguishable from gains in most other states, making it less plausible that it was an effect of KIRIS (Koretz and Barron 1998).

Numerous observers have questioned the use of NAEP as an audit mechanism because the lack of stakes attached to NAEP—which does not even provide scores for individual students—may depress performance on NAEP. The issue of the potential impact of motivation on NAEP performance and on the validity of cross-sectional inferences based on NAEP has been the subject of considerable discussion in the field (for example, Kiplinger and Linn 1995; O’Neil, Sugrue, and Baker 1995; Reckase 2001), although empirical evidence on its actual effects remains limited. However, even if low motivation has an effect on NAEP performance, this would undermine the appropriateness of NAEP as an audit measure only if the impact of motivation were to increase over time. A much more plausible hypothesis is that whatever decrement in student motivation is caused by NAEP’s low stakes is relatively consistent over time.

KIRIS gains also showed limited generalizability to the ACT among students who took both tests. The most striking divergence in trends was in mathematics, which showed a gain on KIRIS of over two-thirds of a standard deviation in a mere three years but a trivial decline on the ACT (Figure 3). In reading, KIRIS gains were smaller than in mathematics but did not generalize at all to the ACT. In science, students showed a gain on both tests, but the gain on the ACT was one-fourth as large as that on KIRIS (Koretz and Barron 1998).

At least two studies have found that teachers themselves lack confidence in the meaningfulness of the score gains in their own schools. In a survey of representative samples of educators in Kentucky, Koretz et al. (1996a) asked respondents how much each of seven factors had contributed to score gains in their own schools. Just over half of the teachers said that “increased familiarity with KIRIS” and “work with practice tests and preparation materials” had contributed a great deal. In contrast, only 16 percent reported that “broad improvements in knowledge and skills” had contributed a great deal. Only 24 percent said that “improvements in knowledge and skills emphasized in KIRIS” (a reference to real gains that might not generalize to other tests) had contributed a great deal. Similar responses were found in a parallel study of the Maryland School Performance Assessment Program (MSPAP), which is perceived as high-stakes but has fewer important consequences (Koretz et al. 1996b).
The special problem of initial gains

Interpretation of gains in scores during the first years of any testing program is clouded by the large gains that typically accompany introduction of the new test. For many years, psychometricians have noted that the introduction of a new test, even in the absence of high stakes, is typically accompanied by an initial drop in scores followed by a rapid increase. This is shown in Figure 4 (adapted from Linn 2000), which aggregates trends from numerous states in the 1980s.

These rapid increases stem from teachers and students growing familiar with the new test, and they may or may not represent meaningful gains in achievement. Teachers may begin teaching a part of the domain that was previously not included in the curriculum, thus creating real gains in performance. They may simply shift time among parts of the domain to reflect the different emphases of the new test. They may find ways to coach inappropriately, and some may cheat. Absent additional information, one cannot tell from aggregate data what mix of these responses occurred, and one therefore cannot judge how meaningful the gains are. The simple ubiquity of this pattern, however, is reason enough for caution in interpreting initial gains.

Can gains be attributed to teachers?

Even when score gains provide meaningful information about increases in student achievement, their use to evaluate teachers requires that one ascertain what share of gains is attributable to their efforts. This is a classic problem of inference from quasi-
experimental designs, and the general methodological issues that arise are not discussed here. It is important, however, to note a few factors that are specific to the use of test scores to evaluate teachers.

Unless a test is very narrow in scope, the behavior of a specific teacher will typically control a very modest share of test score variance. There are two reasons for this. One is that much of the variance in test scores is controlled by factors outside of the direct control of schools, such as ethnicity, parental education, and income. The second is that while learning in many subject areas is cumulative, students are generally assigned to a given teacher for at most a single year.

Controlling for the effects of factors other than the behavior of the target teacher would be difficult even with good data, but it is daunting when the evaluator is constrained to use the data most states and localities can provide. Most educational databases include extremely limited information on noneducational factors known to exert strong influences in performance. Most school systems, for example, lack data on parental education, and the available data on income are typically limited to a weak dichotomous proxy, eligibility for free or reduced-price lunch. In addition, most jurisdictions test infrequently. Many states, for example, test in a given subject only once per three or four grades. Some states lack data systems that would allow evaluators to track students over time or to link their records to teachers.

Numerous states and localities (for example, the Kentucky system noted above) have adopted an approach in which improvement across repeated cross-sections is used to evaluate schools. These models require generally unverified assumptions about reasonable rates of change. For example, should low-achieving schools be expected to show larger gains, as they were in Kentucky, because of an assumption that they are on average less effective or simply because they have farther to go? Or should one assume that students in high-scoring schools, coming on average from

**Figure 4**
*Trends in Scores (Percentile Ranks) When a New Test Form is Introduced*
more advantaged backgrounds, will be better able to take advantage of improved or toughened curricula? At what point should one assume that further progress is either impractical, or even undesirable because attaining it would unduly divert resources from other important goals? In addition, estimates of annual change from small aggregates are unreliable. Short-term trends can be biased by differences in the characteristics of successive cohorts of students, variations in student transience, and various aggregate-level shocks to the system, such as staffing changes (for example, Kane and Staiger 2001).

As typically implemented, these models also pose problems of test construction. Typically, states use a single test to gauge the gains of all schools, regardless of their levels of achievement or curricular emphasis. To be useful as an indicator of school effectiveness, this test must be sensitive to change and able to produce reliable estimates across the distribution of achievement, which requires that the test include substantial amounts of material at the appropriate level of difficulty and appropriate to each school’s instruction. Meeting these criteria for the range of schools found in many districts would require a very long test, with able students wasting time on questions of basic skills and less able students demoralized by numerous questions that are beyond their capability and even understanding. Techniques such as computer-adaptive testing (which adjusts the difficulty of a test as items are administered to students) and two-stage adaptive testing (in which a short screening test is used to assign forms of varying difficulty to students at different levels of difficulty) can substantially lessen this problem, but they are not widely used in large-scale accountability assessments.

Despite these difficulties, the approach of using change across successive cohorts is likely to remain popular because it is in some respects undemanding. It can be used without testing in every grade. It does not require that tests administered in different grades be placed on the same scale or even have overlapping content. It does not require tracking students over time or dealing with concomitant problems of attrition and accretion.

Several researchers have argued that only a value-added model using longitudinal data can provide an adequate basis for judging the effectiveness of schools and teachers, and a few large districts and states (for example, Tennessee) have implemented value-added systems. This approach too faces substantial hurdles. It requires at least annual testing using assessments with content that overlaps substantially from grade to grade. If testing is done only annually, this approach is useful only when the curriculum is cumulative across grades. For example, it could be useful in reading and probably in elementary school mathematics, but its applicability to secondary school science is arguable. Moreover, annual testing (in contrast to fall-spring testing) could lead to biased estimates of teacher effectiveness because of group differences in the achievement trends students show over the summer months, when not in school. Finally, as generally implemented, value-added models also confront the challenge of providing both sensitivity to change and reliability at a wide range of performance levels within a reasonable amount of testing time. Because of the frequency of required testing and the need for reliable estimates of growth, value-added testing may lead educators to focus on relatively narrow domains and to use tests that are inexpensive and require relatively little testing time.
VI. Perverse Incentives

The logic of using achievement tests as an accountability mechanism is simple: we want teachers to produce student achievement, and if we hold them accountable for doing so, they will produce more of it. Unfortunately, the evidence to date suggests that test-based accountability does not necessarily work well.

One reason why test-based accountability does not reliably work well is that it creates incentives to raise scores per se, not to improve achievement. To the extent that tests are limited measures of latent constructs, these incentives are not the same.

There is evidence that some test-based accountability systems have in fact generated changes desired by their proponents, even though some of those same systems also produced undesirable changes and inflated scores. For example, Koretz, Stecher, Klein, and McCaffrey (1994) found that in response to the Vermont portfolio assessment system, teachers reported making numerous changes in instruction consonant with the goals of the assessment program, such as having students spend more time applying math to real situation, devoting more class time to the use of graphs and charts, and having students spend more time writing about mathematics. Similarly, Koretz, Barron, Mitchell, and Stecher (1996a) found that teachers responding to Kentucky’s KIRIS assessment by increasing writing for a variety of purposes, placing more emphasis on mathematical communication, and spending more time on mathematical problem-solving “using meaningful tasks” (p. 26). In some instances, test-based accountability may have spurred some teachers to work harder, to work more effectively, or to reallocate instructional time and other resources from less important activities to more important ones.

Nonetheless, the evidence noted above showing inflated score gains is accompanied by evidence showing teacher behaviors that could cause such inflation. These behaviors are of several types. Some are often labeled “teaching to the test,” but that phrase is inherently ambiguous, in that it can subsume desirable as well as undesirable behaviors. It is more useful to group the behaviors that can inflate scores into three categories: (1) reallocation; (2) cheating; and (3) coaching. (For a discussion of various types of test preparation and their effects on the validity of score increases, see Koretz, McCaffrey, and Hamilton 2001).

A. Reallocating achievement

Some of the possible responses to high-stakes testing are likely to produce meaningful score gains. Under certain reasonable assumptions, these responses would include spending more time on instruction, working harder, and employing more effective instructional methods.

Many proponents of high-stakes testing, however, expect positive effects from a fourth type of response as well, which we call reallocation of instructional resources to focus more on content deemed particularly important. In the current policy debate,

3. Because the focus of this volume is incentives for educators, we focus here on the reallocation of instructional resources. However, reallocation need not be limited to those resources a teacher employs in instruction; it may also extend, for example, to parental behavior and students’ allocations of study time (Koretz et al. 2001).
this desired form of reallocation is generally called "alignment." Assuming that instruction remains similarly effective when it is shifted, reallocation of resources results in a reallocation of achievement as well.

Numerous studies have found that teachers report reallocating resources in response to high-stakes testing (for example, Darling-Hammond and Wise 1985; Koretz et al. 1996a, 1996b; Salmon-Cox 1982, 1984; Shepard 1988b; Shepard and Dougherty 1991). Teachers may deemphasize either material from the same subject area or a different one, although secondary school teachers are often constrained to do the former.

A recent study by Stecher and Barron (1999) examined yet another form of reallocating instructional resources: reallocation across grades in response to "milepost testing," the frequent practice of administering accountability tests in a given subject only in a few grades. Stecher and Barron examined teachers’ responses to the Kentucky accountability program and found that instructional time was allocated differently across grades to match the demands of the testing program. For example, teachers in the fourth grade, the grade in which science was tested, reported spending an average of 5.2 hours/week on science, compared to 3.5 hours/week by teachers in the fifth grade. Conversely, teachers in the fifth grade, the grade in which mathematics was tested, reported spending an average of 6.4 hours/week teaching mathematics, compared to 4.9 hours/week in the fourth grade. The investigators found that even instructional strategies, such as the use of open-response questions with multiple correct answers, were allocated differentially across grades to match the testing program.

The impact of reallocation on the validity of score gains—that is, the extent to which reallocation of achievement represents meaningful gains in achievement—depends not only on the material that receives increased emphasis, but also on the material that receives the offsetting decrease in resources. Clearly, if teachers shift resources from relatively unimportant to relatively important content—that is, important or unimportant to the specific inferences supported by scores—then reallocation should produce meaningful score gains. But to the extent that reallocation takes resources away from important material, score gains will be inflated. Under these conditions, score increases may represent real gains in performance on tested parts of the domain, but they are misleading as estimates of improvement in the domain as a whole.

**B. Cheating**

Enough incidents of cheating have come to light to show that it is not rare. In a recent case, investigators in New York City charged that dozens of educators had cheated over a period of five years by giving students answers to the mathematics and reading tests that are used both as promotional gates and to rank schools. Educators told students which answers to change, had them put their initial answers on scrap paper and then correct them before transferring them to the answer sheet, and gave them practice tests containing questions from the operational test (Goodnough 1999). As this is written, at least 71 schools in 22 districts have been notified that they are under investigation for possible cheating on the 2001 Michigan state assessment
Several other incidents have been noted in the press in recent months. Data on the incidence of cheating is scarce, but high-stakes testing can be expected to increase it, and one pair of studies found evidence that it may. In the study of Kentucky educators noted earlier, Koretz et al. (1996a) found that 36 percent of teachers reported seeing test questions rephrased during testing time either occasionally or frequently. Twenty-one percent reported seeing questions about content answered during testing time, and the same percentage reported seeing revisions recommended either during or after testing. Seventeen percent reported observing hints provided on correct answers. In contrast, in Maryland, where stakes were much lower, smaller percentages of teachers reported such inappropriate practices (Koretz et al. 1996b). Of course, numerous other factors could have contributed to this difference, and more empirical evidence is needed on the incidence and causes of cheating.

The incidence of cheating is not in itself an argument against high-stakes testing. It does, however, indicate the need for caution in interpreting gains, and it serves as a warning of incentives that can induce a variety of other, less clearly illegitimate efforts to raise scores per se rather than improve learning in the broad sense.

C. Coaching

"Coaching" is used here to refer to the residual category of teacher behaviors that can inflate scores but that are examples of neither cheating nor reallocating real achievement. This category is both diverse and poorly delineated, as it blends into appropriate instruction and cheating. Moreover, while there are numerous anecdotal reports of various types of coaching, little systematic research describes the range of coaching strategies and their effects.

A primary form of coaching is tailoring instruction too closely to the demands of tasks used in the test, without actually teaching the specific tasks in the test. Teachers may coach by focusing either on nonsubstantive aspects of a test (for example, specific aspects of item format) or by focusing on substantive but very narrow aspects of items.

Some education reformers will argue that there is nothing wrong with coaching as long as the tasks are "worth teaching to," by which they mean that students will learn something of value by practicing them. For present purposes, however, it is not sufficient for tasks to be "worth teaching to" in this respect. It is also essential that gains on the test generalize to the domain of interest. If teaching is so tightly aligned with the specifics of the test that generalization is substantially limited, the result will be inflated gains even if the tasks are "worth teaching to." This form of coaching can shade into the reallocation of achievement described above.

Stecher and Mitchell (1995) found an interesting variant of coaching: instruction focused on scoring rubrics. To some extent, attention to rubrics is desirable; it can make it clear to students what aspects of performance are expected. If carried to an extreme, however, it becomes another technique for improving performance on the specific tasks in the test rather than mastery of the domain. For example, it can lead teachers to ignore tasks not well suited to the rubrics and de-emphasize skills not addressed by them. The authors labeled this form of coaching "rubric-driven instruc-
tion,” a play on the phrase “measurement-driven instruction” used in the 1980s by many advocates of test-based accountability (for example, Popham et al. 1985).

VII. Discussion

There is ample reason to be skeptical about the potential of many current test-based accountability systems and to doubt the meaning of the rapid gains in scores they often produce. It is less clear, however, how to build more effective accountability systems. Rigorous research is limited, and research comparing the effects of alternative systems is nearly nonexistent. Moreover, because the current approaches appear commonsensical to so many, we have practical experience with a limited range of systems.

Numerous alternative directions may hold promise, but they are offered here with several caveats. The dearth of research makes many of these suggestions speculative. Because of the narrowness of our practical experience with accountability systems, it is not clear how some of these ideas should be implemented. Others entail technical or logistical problems. Finally, a “solution” to the problem is unlikely. The design of an accountability system involves trade-offs among competing goals. For example, the desire for a more inflation-resistant assessment for judging schools conflicts with the need for fairness over time in evaluating individual students; the desirability of broad test coverage competes with the need to limit testing time, and so on. An often-unrecognized tension is that between the desires for objective measurement and good incentives. We argue that at this time creating the appropriate incentives for teachers may require a mix of objective with somewhat more subjective measures.

A. Improve the Design and Use of Accountability-Oriented Tests

Some steps can be taken to lessen, but probably not eliminate, the vulnerability of assessments to score inflation:

1. Tie Assessments to Clear Curricula

In order to teach to the intended domains rather than to the specific test, teachers need to know what the intended domains are. Insufficiently clear and specific guidelines increase the incentive to focus instruction on the assessment alone rather than on the domains it is intended to represent; even many teachers who want to teach the whole domain will perforce use the test for guidance in allocating instructional resources. This suggestion may seem commonsensical, but it is widely ignored in practice, in part as a matter of principle. That is, some reformers want to avoid what they see as overly prescriptive curricular guidelines. However, in their absence, the test itself will provide the prescriptiveness, with undesirable consequences.

2. Design Tests for Use in Accountability Systems

If sufficient resources were committed to the task, testing programs could be designed to lessen the severity of score inflation. For example, reuse of test items could
be strictly controlled, and systems to monitor for inflation could be built into the assessment system as a disincentive to coach inappropriately.

In theory, if a curriculum were specified clearly, rules could be established for sampling from it to maximize coverage of the domain over the moderate term, thus lessening the incentive to coach inappropriately. Teachers could be told that regardless of what happened to be sampled in the assessment for one year, anything in the curriculum could be sampled for the assessment in the next year, following the specified rules. The incentive to focus instruction narrowly, based on the previous assessments, would thus be reduced. This approach would pose substantial technical difficulties, however, because lessening score inflation might require that those successive forms of the test be substantially nonequivalent. Although it would be feasible to adjust for differences in average difficulty over time, it would be difficult to equate properly—that is, to make it a matter of indifference to individual examinees which form they are administered. It is never feasible to equate perfectly, but in a system of this type, the percentage of students who fail using one form and would pass had they taken a form from a different year may be higher than is common in some current testing systems.

3. Set Realistic Goals for the Improvement of Performance

The amount and speed of performance improvements are constrained by factors beyond the control of education policymakers and educators. Requiring faster changes than teachers can effect by appropriate means may exacerbate the problem of inflated scores. Because teachers can improve students’ mastery of tested material more rapidly than they can improve mastery of the much larger domains it is intended to represent, excessively high goals will increase the incentive to narrow instruction inappropriately. To be realistic, targets for improvement should be based on information about the distribution of student performance and about the capacities of schools to change. This suggestion too appears commonsensical but is widely ignored in practice. It is common for improvement targets to be set without regard for either the actual distribution of performance or the magnitude of improvements that are practical in a given setting, and the rate of expected improvement is sometimes unrealistic.

Limit interpretation of initial gains. The interpretation of initial gains on a new assessment is clouded by the likelihood of inflation from familiarization. One way to address this problem would be to limit interpretations of initial gains, particularly when high stakes raise the risk of inflation. Sponsors could warn the public and other stakeholders that initial gains are likely to be exaggerated by familiarization and that only longer-term gains are likely to be grounds for confident inferences about meaningful improvement in student learning. We are aware of no state assessment program today that downplays initial gains.

B. Widen the Range of Student Outcomes Used for Accountability

Even with improvements to assessment systems, some unintended negative incentives and concomitant inflated gains are likely to remain, and some valued outcomes of education will remain poorly tested or untested entirely. The larger question posed
by inflated scores is therefore the role that test scores and other variables should play in an accountability system.

The desirability of including outcomes other than test scores is widely accepted, and numerous states have taken limited steps in this direction. For example, numerous states consider attendance and dropout rates in evaluating schools. Kentucky was one of the first states to do so, and its approach remains more ambitious than most. Kentucky incorporated into its accountability index measures such as a dropout rate, an attendance rate, the rate of retention in grade, and a rate of successful transition to postsecondary education or work. Some of these indicators, however, show limited variance and little room for improvement, so their impact on the Kentucky index was minor (Koretz and Barron 1998). Moreover, some of these are largely outside the control of educators, so their use provides little incentive to change practice.

What then can policymakers do to use a broader range of outcomes effectively? Research and relevant experience are both limited, but several possible directions warrant further exploration:

1. **Use Multiple Distal Measures of Achievement**

The term “distal” is used here to denote measures that are infrequent and are thus distant from daily decisions made by teachers. It is an axiom of measurement that any single measure of cognitive performance provides only limited information about the construct(s) of interest and that multiple measures are therefore preferable. Administering diverse assessments of achievement would lessen incentives to narrow instruction, and numerous states do use more than a single assessment. However, this approach is limited by the financial costs, time demands, and disruption of instruction caused by testing, and its impact is likely to be limited when one test has much higher stakes than any of the others.

2. **Use Distal Noncognitive Measures**

Despite the limitations of many distal noncognitive measures such as dropout rates, there are strong arguments for including some measures of this type in accountability systems. Including noncognitive measures may help identify certain types of behavior that could distort the interpretation of scores, such as allowing increased dropout rates, increasing the rate of exclusions from testing, and so on. For example, Haney (1999) has argued that the narrowing of racial/ethnic disparities in scores on the high-stakes Texas test, TAAS, has been accompanied by a dramatic drop in the high school graduation rates of Hispanic and African American students.

3. **Use Measures of Proximal Outcomes**

The phrase “proximal outcomes” is used here to refer to the short- and moderate-term changes in student motivation, behavior, knowledge, and skills that rightly occupy much of the attention of excellent teachers. Only some of a good teacher’s success in producing these proximal outcomes will be reflected in distal achievement measures. Worse, excessive pressure to change performance on distal measures may
divert better teachers from efforts to meet important proximal goals. Many of the
demoralizing anecdotes about the impact of high-stakes testing refer to this.

Whether it is feasible to incorporate measures of proximal outcomes into central-
ized accountability systems, however, remains to be demonstrated. Many efforts to
develop and evaluate proximal measures are underway, but those efforts are most
often divorced from the development of centralized accountability systems.

4. Use Measures of Ongoing Student Work

Just as accountability for scores on distal tests may distort the incentives facing
teachers on a daily basis, it may lead students to downplay the importance of their
ongoing academic work. Some students will simply ask what is on the test and give
short shrift to work that is not, even if that work is important.

Because the value of teacher-assigned grades is undermined by inconsistencies
in grading standards, many reformers have suggested using portfolio assessment
systems, in which an accumulation of student work is evaluated, as a more credible
means of giving students and teachers incentives to focus on the quality of ongoing
work. There is some evidence that portfolio assessment programs can indeed provide
incentives to improve ongoing practice, although its effects are inconsistent, and it
is burdensome (for example, Koretz, et al. 1994; Stecher 1998). However, portfolio
assessment is by its very nature unstandardized; scoring can be standardized, but
the tasks assigned generally are not, and the conditions under which the tasks are
performed often vary dramatically from classroom to classroom. These characteris-
tics undermine the ability of portfolio assessments to provide the accuracy and compar-
ability of data required by high-stakes centralized accountability systems (Koretz
et al. 1994; Koretz 1998), although it remains possible that with additional develop-
ment, portfolios could be made a useful component of an accountability system, as
a measure of either student achievement or of teaching.

C. Use Direct Measures of Teachers’ Practice

The limitations of standardized distal measures of achievement as incentives and
the lack of ready methods for measuring proximal outcomes and the quality of ongo-
ing student work suggests that accountability systems should include direct measures
of teachers’ practice as well as measures of student outcomes.

The arguments against direct measures of practice are numerous. There is disag-
reement about the types of practice that foster achievement. (In part, this stems
from disagreements about the types of learning that are most valued, however, so
this problem affects outcome-based accountability as well.) In many instances, a
range of instructional methods are appropriate, and individual teachers may find
different ones effective. Measures of practice are sometimes “fakable”; teachers
have been known to have a special lesson prepared for the day when an observer
appears without warning. Measuring practice is expensive and, if not mechanistic,
somewhat subjective. Evaluations of teachers that depend on expert judgment require
that individuals with expertise spend their time evaluating peers rather than teaching
students.

The arguments in favor of direct measurement of teachers’ practice, however, are
also strong. Given the limitations of distal achievement tests for this purpose and the undeveloped state of measures of proximal outcomes and ongoing work, it may not be possible to provide teachers with the appropriate mix of incentives without some degree of reliance on direct measures of their practice. Moreover, accountability systems in some other areas, such as health care, rely substantially on measures of the quality of practice. Further research is needed, however, to ascertain the utility of direct measures of practice in educational accountability systems.

**D. A Hybrid Model: Using Scores to Trigger Additional Investigation**

It might be feasible to obtain some benefits of test-based accountability while ameliorating its drawbacks by using scores on tests as a criterion for targeting more intensive investigations of school quality. For example, persistently low scores or a failure to raise them could trigger an evaluation designed to identify both educational and extraneous factors that are influencing scores and to clarify whether the trends in scores really should be taken as a sign of program effectiveness. Similarly, this approach could be extended to schools that show suspiciously rapid improvements in scores.

A hybrid model of this sort might save money and burden, focus evaluative efforts where they have a particularly good chance of mattering, and avoid some erroneous sanctioning of schools. Ideally, it would lessen the incentives to inflate scores. Depending on the evaluative model chosen, however, this method could inappropriately exempt many schools from further examination.

The effectiveness of this hybrid approach, however, remains unclear. Large-scale use of such approaches have been limited in recent years to exceptional cases. For example, Kentucky used audits to address bias in the scores many teachers assigned to the writing portfolios of their own students (see, for example, Hambleton et al. 1995) but did not use it to explore the causes of small gains in some schools or of the apparent inflation of score gains outside of writing.

**E. Develop a Research and Development Agenda for Educational Accountability**

The drive for greater educational accountability continues to gain momentum, and student testing continues to gain importance. The consequences attached to performance on tests continues to grow. Yet we have growing evidence that test-based accountability policies are not working as intended, and we have no adequate research-based alternative to offer to the policy community. In this situation, the role of researchers is like that of the proverbial custodian walking behind the elephant with a broom. The policies are implemented, and after the fact a few researchers are allowed to examine the effects and offer yet more bad news.

What is needed is an active program of research focused on both the development and the evaluation of alternative methods of holding educators accountable. This research should examine directly the mix of incentives provided to teachers, their resulting changes in practice, the quality of performance information yielded by the system, and its ultimate effects on student learning.

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